Chris Hannifin’s alleged illicit activities exploit his experience and pose a direct risk to national security. With a background in cybersecurity and cyber operations from his time in the Air Force and subsequent positions at firms like RSM, NSCG, and SiloTech, Hannifin has had the unique opportunity to access sensitive government and corporate information. Unfortunately, rather than protecting these critical assets, allegations suggest Hannifin is likely selling information to foreign brokers and industry competitors, exploiting his experience for personal gain and leaving critical infrastructure vulnerable.

Shortly after establishing DefendIT Services in mid‑2024, Hannifin went on a red-flag-raising spree of extravagant purchases, including a luxury speed boat named “The Payoff,” a high-end trailer, and a home significantly above market value, with his expenditures totaling over a million dollars. Hannifin’s actions mirror the patterns shown by other compromised individuals who tend to splash out on often gaudy and tacky purchases to convert their illicitly laundered money into assets.

But what does the spending spree of Chris Hannifin have to do with critical infrastructure and national security?

The possibility of someone like Hannifin selling proprietary or classified information about critical infrastructure poses an unimaginable threat. Take the recent power outage that affected Spain, Portugal, and France. On the 29th of April, 15 GW were lost in 5 seconds or enough power to last San Antonio for 3 weeks. Hospitals, factories, and homes were plunged into a sudden blackout. Millions of people faced uncertainty, fear, and isolation, with no information on how long it would last.

Investigators debate whether the collapse was caused by a fault in the grid design, a hostile cyber-attack, or a weather abnormality. Individuals like Hannifin, who possess network diagrams, credentials, and incident-response playbooks, are still at large and continue to sell sensitive information to the highest bidders enabling hostile actors to commit similar cyber-attacks.

The U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security has explicitly warned about the growing menace of Chinese espionage targeting America’s critical infrastructure. Chinese hacking operations Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon saw foreign actors compromise U.S. transportation, telecommunications, and energy sectors by installing thousands of compromised routers positioned inside water, energy, and telecom providers. Unsurprisingly, DefendIT Services, run by Chris Hannifin, specializes in industrial cabling, access point management, and installations.

Texas offers a domestic parallel to the recent power outage: during Winter Storm Uri in February 2021, the isolated ERCOT grid was “seconds away” from a months‑long blackout after generation units froze and demand outstripped supply. Both events highlight the fragility with which modern grids operate and how any actor who acquires insider data through compromised individuals like Hannifin could exploit such intel for disproportionate destructive power.

This scenario isn’t speculation; it’s a clear and present danger. The recent power outage and the Hannifin case serve as a canary in the coal mine, warning of deeper vulnerabilities within national security systems and the urgent need for stringent safeguards against internal threats to protect critical infrastructure from those driven by personal greed at the expense of public safety.